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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RODNEY B. JENSEN ) 
Defendant and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent.) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
RODNEY B. JENSEN 
Appeal from the First Judicial District court of Box Elder County, 
Honorable L. F. Gunnell, District Court Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant appeals from a Final conviction and Sentencing 
rendered on the 9th day of April, 1990. This case was tried to a 
jury in the District Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of 
Utah on September 25, 1989, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, Judge, 
presiding. Thp- n*=>.f«*r>Hant wa_« charged and convicted of possession 
of a controlled substance, in violation of 58-37-8(2) (a) (i ) . U.CA. 
(}z*B6)i poK^KSion nf drug paraphernalia, in violation of 58-37a-
5-(b), and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of 76-10-
504(a), in an Information dated the March 1, 1989. 
The Defendant, after a ninety-day evalual.lun at the Utah State 
Prison, *mn sentenced to serve a term of 0 to 5 years at the Utah 
State Prison for the possession of controlled snbst*nr*» nharg^? one 
y«ar In t^ p Bo* Elder County Jail for the carrying of a concealed 
weapon charge; and six months in the Box Eld^r County .Tall for the 
possession of firiiij jwr^ph^rnHlia charge, with all sentences to run 
concurrently. In addition, Defendant was ordered to pay $2,000.00 
in fines. 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Sentence of 
the District Court in connection with the possession of controlled 
substance charge and for a determination by this Court that the 
Appellant is entitled to a Judgment of Acquittal. In the 
alternative, Appellant seeks an Order a remanding the matter for 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reference as to the Record on Appeal shall be made as follows: 
Tr., Page Number of the Transcript; R., page number of the Court 
file included in the record on appeal, and Exh., Trial Exhibit. 
On December 22, 1988, the Defendant was arrested by Officer 
Bill Beckman of the Tremonton, Utah, Police Department a Traffic 
Control Patrol Officer. He said he was aware that there was an 
outstanding Bench Warrant for Jensen from the Third Circuit Court 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and pulled him over. 
Officer Beckman called his dispatch to verify whether the 
warrant was still valid. Upon being advised that it was, he placed 
Mr. Jensen under arrest and transported him to the Tremonton City 
Police Department. The Officer then conducted a searched of the 
person, and discovered that Jensen had a pistol in a holster on his 
right hip and that it was covered by the long green army coat he 
wore. A clip magazine and a box of ammunition were found in the 
lower right pocket of the jacket. 
During a further search of the jacket the Officer found or 
felt something round. He didn't know what it was, but thought it 
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might be a another loaded cartridge that was just in a pocket. His 
testimony was: "I opened the pocket, and pulled out a brown cotton 
bag out of his pocket. I asked him what it was and he says it was 
his first aid kit. I really didn't know what it was at the time. 
I placed it on the desk behind me and continued searching and found 
no other evidence. I placed Mr. Jensen then at that time in 
handcuffs."(Tr.18). 
Officer Beckman then opened up the bag and found a mirror, 
a brown vial with a white powdery substance in it and a razor blade 
in a cardboard protector, and placed those items in an evidence 
bag. He then advised the Defendant that he was going to be charged 
with carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia and transported the 
Defendant to the Box Elder County Jail. 
At the Trial the State called Arthur Terkleson, a Weber State 
College Crime Lab manager and criminalist as its expert witness. 
Among his other duties he performed analysis and identified and 
examined evidence for purposes of Court testimony (Tr. 63). On 
December 23, 1988, he received from Officer Beckman a bag with a 
small brown bottle in it, a metal tube and a mirror with a razor 
blade (Tr. 64). 
He took a very, very small amount and added sulfuric acid and 
formalin, a test otherwise called the Marquis Test, and the brown 
color is the reaction which he observed as testing positive for 
amphetamines (Tr. 67). He then ran a gas chromatograph test, and 
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color is the reaction which he observed as testing positive for 
amphetamines (Tr. 67). He then ran a gas chromatograph test, and 
the samples tested positive for amphetamine He tested both the 
substance out of the tube and the substance out of the vial and 
concluded that the residue from th*=> tub** ™*<^  Tt*ot'h»7«pb«&"'m'J ^ -^  Mr* 
?prkieBon te^tifi^n that the mirror, the bottle, the metal tube and 
the razor blade are consistent with the illicit use of a drug, 
either conaJne or ^-"b^phetaraine. He did not calculate how much 
of the substance was in the vial (Tr. 73). 
He did not make a determination as to the purity of the 
substance, but he supposed that this ^s^ not one-hundred percent 
pure- The results of the test h^ -conducted iust demonstrated the 
presence of methamph^tajwirie. Ba^ed on bis experience, ho would 
v;,ak^  a tongh e^.Liraate i:hat th*-* quantity in the vial was between 15 
and 25 milligrams simply by looking nt It, (Tr. 75} • 
H^ said that If ^oi»«one were to fill this bottle up and then 
dump it out there would still be some white puwder residue th~L 
would be in the bottle. But he felt chat because there was still 
a small amount in the bottle that could be puu.! ^ «I oul »•« would n.oL 
i-hrtfrtcterize that as simply residue (Tr. 76), 
Terkleson further testified thai n^fh^-fM^;^-.:^ |^ * chemical 
compound and is s i^g^i^rA dvug, i>»ade by pharmaceutical companies 
for medicinal purposes, (Tr. 81). Amphetamines aie coriuuorily 
prescribed for weight less purposes and the chemical essentially 
operates as central nervous stimulant. Such pharma^^ist ical would 
also contain inert or. non-motive ingredients as part of the way 
they are manufactured and packaged. The Federal Drua Administration 
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requires the percentage of active ingredients be disclosed. 
powder than was present in the Defendant's bottle. His estimate 
of 15 to 25 milligrams of powder in the brown vial was "a 
guesstimate"; he did not weigh it out. He stated that his 
analysis, for Court purposes, was simply to determine whether the 
presence of a scheduled compound existed somewhere in the powder, 
and that he was not asked to identify the weight of the particular 
compound. (Tr. 86). 
The chemical tests he used in the laboratory are very 
sensitive tests and relatively small quantities of a compound would 
show a positive result for the presence of that compound. The gas 
chromatograph is quite sensitive. The Marquis test is a visible 
test, so there must be at least enough to see (Tr. 89). He found 
nothing on the mirror and said the mirror and the razor blade, in 
and of themselves, probably would not be paraphernalia. 
He took the position that if there was enough compound to see 
it wiggle around, that it may be a little more than residue, which 
is something that if it (the vial) is upside down or if one is 
trying to pour it out, you could not do so. If it adheres to the 
side, that's residue, but if anything would come out, that's not 
residue, but a sample. 
The chemist stated that the amount of actual methamphetamine 
in the sample was certainly less than 100% of 25 or 15 milligrams 
and could be as low as 5 to 10 milligrams (Tr. 92). He indicated 
that since he did not know the percentage, he therefore could not 
form an opinion as to whether the very small quantity involved 
could have a pharmacological effect on a human being (Tr. 98). 
Mr. Terkleson stated on re-direct examination; "Again, I 
believe it was the same question counsel asked 'is there enough in 
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the sample.7 Because I don't know the percent I can't say that. 
If it's above 50 or 75% then I would say there, well I don't know. 
I don't know if there is enough there or not." The Prosecutor then 
stated "But all you can say with any certainty, and what you do say 
with certainty is that there was in fact methamphetamine present." 
And the chemist replied "Yes, that's correct." (Tr. 98). 
Mr. Terkleson was asked on re-cross (Tr. 98) whether 5 or 10 
milligrams would have any commercial value, since that was far 
smaller than any useful amount. He replied "I would suppose 
somebody who's into drugs and uses drugs would not be very thrilled 
at that amount. I don't know how much money he would give for it. 
But a person who is using drugs would either eat or sniff or inject 
that into their system whether they would get high or not, I've 
already said I wouldn't dare say." With such a small quantity, you 
can't really form an opinion. "Because I don't know the percent." 
(Tr. 99). 
Rodney Jensen testified that he was a 22 year old resident of 
Tremonton, who had lived there pretty much all his life, and was 
living at the family home on the date he was arrested. He was 
employed as a construction worker doing concrete and cement work. 
He hunted and had used firearms since a young age and had taken 
hunters safety courses. He felt he was knowledgeable with respect 
to the handling and use of firearms and did not believe that his 
gun was loaded. He stated that at least five separate actions 
would be needed to fire the weapon. He thought that because the 
weapon was in a holster that it was legal, and said that he was 
carrying it in a safe manner (Tr 108-110). He further said he had 
planned to sell the gun that day. 
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Mr. Jensen further testified that he was unaware that he had 
the illegal items on his person or in his possession. He said that 
the jacket in which they were found was an old jacket. He had not 
even checked his pockets and accordingly had no specific intentions 
regarding the items which were the basis of the prosecution for 
possession of controlled substance and paraphernalia. He testified 
that he did not intend to commit the crimes that he was charged 
with, he was unaware that those items were even on his person. (Tr. 
). 
On cross-examination the Defendant was asked if he knew what 
was in the bag. He replied "I knew there was a mirror and a bottle 
and a straw." 
Q. Did you know what was in the bottle? 
A. There wasn't anything in the bottle, I didn't think. 
Q. Why didn't you think there was anything in the bottle? 
A. Because it didn't look to me that there was. 
The prosecution then stated "So when you say that you didn't 
think there was any left in there what you are really saying is 
that after you go through taking the rest of it you didn't think 
there was much left, is that correct?" 
The Defendant answered "I don't understand what you are saying 
here." (Tr. ) 
At the conclusion of the State's case the Defendant moved for 
dismissal of the Possession of Controlled Substance count on the 
ground that the quantity was insufficient to establish a Third 
Degree Felony charge requiring that the defendant knowingly and 
intentionally possessed a controlled substance. 
The Motion was denied. (Tr. ) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
The Defendant submits that the evidence adduced at his trial 
was insufficient to support his conviction for violation of Utah 
Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1986), which states "it is unlawful for 
any person knowingly and intentionally to possess . . . a 
controlled substance". His position is that while the evidence may 
support a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 58-37a-4(5), and 58-37a-3(10), or 
(12)(f), that the amount of methamphetamine found in the brown vial 
and in the straw was, at most, residue sufficient to establish 
those items as being paraphernalia. Since the amounts detected by 
chemical tests were so minute as to have no medicinal or 
pharmacological effect on a person, nor sufficient to have any 
commercial value the defendant could not knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled substance. 
POINT II: 
THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it (1) makes 
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and 
hence is nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the 
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severity of the crime. A sentence may be excessive if it serves 
no acceptable social purpose or is grossly disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the crime. (R. 180-223). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
It is Defendant's contention that a reasonable interpretation 
of the foregoing Statutes require that the State prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a Defendant exercise control over a drug with 
knowledge of its presence and character, and that a particular 
minimum quantity of methamphetamine is necessary to prove the 
Defendant "knowingly and intentionally possessed" the drug, in 
order to sustain a felony conviction. Defendant submits that this 
Court should reconsider its recent decision in State v. Warner 129 
Utah Adv. Rpt 21, 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1990), and its reliance 
on State v. Winters 16 Utah 2.D 139, 396 P.2d 872 (Utah 1964) for 
the proposition that "no particular quantity of narcotics is 
necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic 
drug". 
The evidence in this case was that the amount was so small 
that the chemist was unable to say whether it would have an effect 
on a person or not. The rule of Warner would permit any person to 
be charged with the felony possession of a controlled substance 
based solely on the finding of residue, a trace, or minute amount 
which would be susceptible of discovery only by extremely 
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sophisticated tests. The sensitivity of the chemistry equipment 
utilized by the drug laboratories is sufficient to detect the 
presence of very minute trace quantities of a drug. The chemist 
in this case estimated the active ingredient to be somewhere in the 
5 to 10 milligram range. Jensen testified that he thought that the 
bottle was empty. In light of the substantial disparity in 
sentencing between a Class "B" misdemeanor penalty for 
paraphernalia and 5 years in prison for possession of amphetamine, 
the quantity involved becomes crucial. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Harbison v. Statef 302 Ark. 
315 (1990) held that a Defendant who possessed a glass bottle that 
contained only cocaine residue could not be convicted of possession 
of cocaine. The facts of Harbison are very similar to the facts 
here and in the Warner case. The Defendant was pulled over for a 
traffic violation, leading to the serving of a warrant of arrest. 
A subsequent search disclosed a brown bottle which gave rise to a 
charge of possession. 
The Arkansas statute states " . . . it is unlawful for any 
person to possess a controlled substance . . . " Harbison argued 
that "all violations are based on weight of the controlled 
substance". The Arkansas Supreme Court perceived the case as 
being squarely, and for the first time, asked to decide whether 
possession of a controlled substance must be of a measurable or 
usable amount to constitute a violation. The Court noted that 
common sense, justice and fairness dictate that the law should not 
punish a person found to be in possession of a container in which 
only a scientist can determine it to contain a controlled 
substance. 
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The Arkansas Court traced the history of decisions which 
require either a usable amount of a substance or an amount 
sufficient to permit the person in possession to know of its 
presence. It cites with approval the Texas cases Greer v. State 163 
Tex Crim. R.377, 292 SW 2.d 122 (1956) and Pellam v. State 164 Tex 
Crim Rpt. 226 298 SW 2.d 171 (1957). The Texas Courts described 
the amounts involved as "infinitesimal" and said "It would be a 
harsh rule indeed that would charge the Appellant with knowingly 
possession that which it required a microscope to identify". 
The California Supreme Court has interpreted its possession 
statute to require a "knowing" possession in the sense. The 
accused must have knowledge of the presence of the object, although 
it is not necessary that she or he have knowledge of its 
"character". The leading California case is People v. Leal 64 Cal. 
2d. 504, 50 Cal. Rpt. 777 413 P2.d 665 (1966). "It is not 
scientific measurement and detection which is the ultimate test of 
the known possession of a narcotic, but rather the awareness of the 
defendant of the presence of the narcotic". 
The Court noted that the presence of residue or a trace 
amount of a forbidden drug poses less danger of future harm and is 
less probative of the intent to using a narcotic in the future, 
than the presence of drug paraphernalia which the legislature has 
made a misdemeanor. The intent of the legislature was to condemn 
the "commodity" which could be used as such. It did not refer to 
[useless] traces or residue of such substance. 
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that to constitute the 
offense of possession a "usable" amount must be found State v. 
Moreno 92 Ariz 116 374 P 2.d 872 (1962). The District of Columbia, 
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Court of Appeals in Edelin v. United States 227 A 2.d 395 (D.C. 
1967) reached a similar decision based on arguments that possession 
of an unusable amount of a prohibited drug was not what Congress 
meant to criminalize because it could neither be used nor sold. 
The Court stated "if this substance cannot be sold, if it cannot 
be administered or dispensed, common sense dictates that it is not 
such a narcotic as contemplated by congress to be a danger to 
society, the possession of which is proscribed". 
These cases were followed in Singly v. United States, 533 
A 2.d 245 (D.C. 1987) and by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. One Gates Lear Jet, 861 
F 2.d 868 (Fifth Circuit 1988). In Singley, the chemical analysis 
of the 70 milligrams of white powder indicated that it contained 
only a "small amount" of heroin. The Court stated that a conviction 
for possession cannot be sustained "where there is only a trace of 
a substance, a chemical constituent not quantitatively determined 
because of minuteness, and there is no additional proof of its 
usability as a narcotic." (at p. 247) The prosecutor conceded that 
the government was not able to prove whether this heroin is in a 
concentration that would have a discernable narcotic effect. The 
Court noted that the government can readily meet its burden of 
proof either by performing more sensitive or precise tests or by 
adopting a uniform terminology that is keyed to the usability of 
a particular substance. 
In U.S. vs. One Gates Learjet Serial No. 28004 (5th Cir. , 
(1988), the government sought to forfeit the airplane for 
transporting cocaine, based upon the vacuuming of the plane and the 
chemists report of finding of a trace of cocaine in the vacuumed 
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dust. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that 
the amount in question was to small to be possessed, used, 
exchanged, or enhanced. It cited with approval cases which consider 
small amounts of controlled substances insufficient to support a 
claimed violation of the narcotics laws. It also noted that the 
government cited several decisions establishing the rubric that the 
amount of the contraband found on the conveyance is not 
controlling. 
There are cases cited which have adopted a blind adherence 
to statutory language requiring a finding of "any" amount of a drug 
or an "identifiable" amount. However, the Utah statute does not 
contain either of those words in its operative phrase. See also 77 
Col L. Rev. 596 (1977). 
The point then becomes whether the rationale is that the 
amount of controlled substance is either (1) sufficient to permit 
knowledge of its presence without the need for scientific 
identification or (2), to be sufficient to be usable in the amount 
in which a substance if ordinarily used. The intent of the 
legislation prohibiting possession of a controlled substance is to 
prevent use of and control use of those substances. Possession of 
a trace amount or residue which cannot be used and which the 
accused may not even know is on his person, or within his control 
contributes to neither evil. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded 
that possession of less than a useable amount of a controlled 
substance is not what Legislators have in mind when they 
criminalized possession because it cannot contribute to future 
conduct at which the legislation is aimed, that is, use of or 
trafficking in drugs. 
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The Supreme Court of California in People v. Leal 413 P 2.d 
665 (1966) discussed the policy considerations in considerable 
detail. The decision traces evolution of the California law which 
requires a usable amount test in order to establish the crime of 
possession and cites with approval the California Supreme Court in 
People v. Sullivanf 1965 234 Cal App 2.d 562 44 Cal Rpt 524 as 
follows: 
"the criminal law is engaged in a 
continuous process of drawing lines 
and in the enforcement of offenses 
involving narcotics, fixed lines 
appear to be unavoidable. To this 
end we believe the legislature has 
established helpful guidelines in 
distinguishing the crimes of 
possession of narcotics 
paraphernalia and being under the 
influence of narcotics, both 
misdemeanors, from the more serious 
crime of possessing the narcotic 
itself, a felony", the 
Court further stated "we conclude 
the possession of a minute 
crystalize residue of [narcotic] not 
intended for consumption or sale and 
useless for either of these purposes 
is insufficient evidence to sustain 
a conviction for known possession of 
a narcotic". 
At page 670 the Court pointed out that the statutory scheme 
is part of an extensive body of narcotics control legislation and 
that the legislature has established many categories of offenses 
to which it has annexed punishments which vary widely in degree. 
The Court stated that in an effort to preserve a separate and 
independent place in the Statutory plan and one which harmonizes 
with other parts of the plan, that it could not overlook the fact 
that the possession of minute traces of narcotics residue poses 
less danger of future harm and is less probative of an intent to 
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use narcotics in the future, than the possession of narcotics 
implements, an offense which the legislature has denominated a 
misdemeanor. 
The Court further stated "the most compelling explanation 
for the vast disparity between punishments next to sections 11500 
and 11555, is that Section 11500 applies to those who by their 
possession of narcotic substances have created a potentiality for 
future use or sale. Whether a Defendant who possesses only minute 
traces of narcotics residue creates such a potentiality is purely 
a question of fact which the prosecution must prove. 
The Court further concluded that the statutory 
differentiation of the various crimes as well as the history of 
the cases show that in penalizing a person who possesses a 
narcotic, the legislature proscribed the possession of a substance 
that has a narcotic potential and condemned the commodity could be 
used as such. It did not refer to useless traces or residue of 
such substance. Hence, the possession of a minute crystalize 
residue of a narcotic useless for either sale or consumption, does 
not constitute sufficient evidence in itself to sustain a 
conviction. See also People v. McCarthy 413 P2.d 671). 
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Fein 484 P 2.d 
583 reaffirmed the line of cases including People v. Leal (supra). 
The Court stated at page 588 "It is now well established that 
evidence of useless traces or residue of narcotic substances do 
not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for 
possession of narcotics". The Court further stated " were we to 
accept evidence of recent past possession of narcotics as 
equivalent to proof of present possession of narcotics, then when 
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we could charge every addict who was currently hot with possession 
of a narcotic since he must have had possession of the narcotic in 
the recent past in order to come under its influence." 
In State v. Moreno 92 Ariz 116 374 P 2.d 872 the Supreme 
Court of Arizona held that the correct rule to be applied under 
the Arizona Statute is that, where the amount of a narcotic is so 
small as to require a chemical analysis to detect its presence, 
the quantity is sufficient if usable under the known practices of 
narcotics addicts. The court held that only in those cases where 
the amount is incapable of being put to any effective use will the 
evidence be insufficient to support a conviction (at page 875). 
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Theel, 505 P 2.d 964 
(1973) reversed a conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana, 
where traces and unusable amounts of narcotics were found in the 
possession of an accused. The Court observed "where the quantity 
involved is so minute that it amounts to only a trace, there is no 
basis from the fact alone for any logical or reasonable inference 
that the Defendant had knowledgeable possession", citing with 
approval State v. Dempsey 22 Ohio State 219 259 N.E. 2.d 745, 748 
(1970). 
The amount of methamphetamine allegedly found on Defendant's 
person may be consistent with the possession of drug 
paraphernalia, but is wholly insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt knowing and intentional possession. The 
Defendant testified that he, at some point, had been aware that he 
had the mirror, the tube and the small vial. And although it had 
contained methamphetamine one time, he thought that the drug had 
been used up at some remote point in time in the past. The 
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chemist, although able to identify a discernable amount of white 
powder in the bottom of the vial, was unable to testify with any 
certainty that the compound would have any effect on a human 
being, nor have any commercial value. The State failed to prove 
a usable amount or the fact that the defendant "knowingly and 
intentionally possessed it. 
Defendant submits that the line of cases decided in 
California, Arizona, Colorado, Washington D.C., Arkansas, Ohio, 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States are 
the better reasoned decisions. To hold otherwise would be to blur 
the distinction between a "residue case" and a "possession case". 
If the "no particular quantity" argument is followed 
literally, any paraphernalia case based on allegations of residue, 
traces, or small amounts also would not only support that but 
would also support a possession case as well. In light of the 
considerable disparity in penalties it would seem unreasonable to 
presume that the legislature intended to those punishments for 
possession of minute or trace amounts of any illegal drug. 
In U.S. vs. Property at 2323 Charms Rd., Milford Tp., 726 F. 
Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1989), the Court cited U.S. vs. One Gates 
Learjet, supra, with approval. That Court further stated, in 
denying the government's complaint for forfeiture of an aircraft: 
The government's enthusiasm for the use of the 
forfeiture power to increase the risk of 
engaging in drug trafficking should not blind 
it to considerations of fairness in dealing 
with its constituents. In this regard, the 
Court is reminded of Justice Brandeis' 
dissenting words in Olmstead v. United Statesf 
227 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572-73, 72 L. 
Ed. 944 (1928): 
Experience should teach us to be most on 
our guard to protect liberty when the 
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Governments purposes are beneficent. Men 
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel 
invasion of their liberty be evil-minded 
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk 
in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding. 
It is a well established principle of criminal responsibility 
that a citizen be adequately informed by the government of the 
consequences of his conduct. The present existing interpretation 
of the law creates a snare for the unwary, leads to selective 
prosecutions and occasions far harsher punishments than the actual 
nature of the conduct warrants. 
POINT TWO 
THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION 
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The scope of cruel and unusual punishment clause extends not 
only to barbarous methods of punishment, but also to punishments 
that grossly disproportionate. Disproportionality analysis 
measures the relationship between the nature and number of offenses 
committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the 
offender. See Rummel v. Estel 445 US 263 63 L.Ed 2.d 382 100 Sc 
1133 (1980)(and cases cited therein). See also Solem v. Helm 463 
US 277 77 L.Ed 2.d 637 100 Sc 3001. Weems v. United States 21 US 
349 54 L.Ed 793 30 Sc 544 (1910). 
A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it (1) makes 
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and 
hence is nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime. A sentence may be excessive if it serves 
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no acceptable social purpose or is grossly disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the crime. 
In the instant case, Jensen had no prior felony convictions, 
and had no prior drug related convictions, although he had a 
history of problems with the abuse of alcohol. The Court conducted 
a Sentencing Hearing in which evidence was adduced on the behalf 
of the Defendant. The Defendant admitted that he had problems with 
drugs and alcohol in the past but was desirous of entering into a 
treatment facility. His grandparents in Idaho volunteered to offer 
him a free place to live, and promised to supervise him closely. 
He had an uncle in the area who assured him a job where he could 
learn a useful trade. A drug and alcohol counselor who had 
formerly supervised Jensen wrote the Court and pointed out the 
availability of various mental health and anti-drug programs in the 
immediate area.(R. 180-223). 
The case in favor of incarceration was primarily based upon 
the use of the matrixes and definitions of his prior record. 
Defendant submits for purposes of this appeal that the analysis 
conducted by the Adult Parole and Probation Department was flawed 
and erroneous. Therefore, he argues that he received a much harsher 
sentence than would be warranted by the objective facts of his 
background and criminal history. 
Defendant submits that it is cruel and unusual punishment in 
contravention of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution to impose 
a 5 year prison sentence for an offense involving an unusable and 
valueless amount of methamphetamine. The particular chemical in 
question in the instant case is a commonly prescribed medicinal 
compound which has been on the market in various forms for many, 
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many years. Amphetamines have been made available through the 
pharmaceutical distribution system, as well as by unauthorized 
laboratories. In many countries amphetamines are routinely sold 
in drugstores without prescription. 
In light of the prevalence of methamphetamine in both legal 
and illegal forms, Defendant submits that public policy 
considerations should not encourage creating felons out of ordinary 
citizens who inadvertently may be found in possession of trace or 
minute or insubstantial quantities of this particular substance. 
In the instant case, where the amount involved was so small that 
no determination that it would be useful could be made, would seem 
to be an appropriate case to decide that 5 years imprisonment for 
an amount of amphetamine that has no useful value, either as a drug 
or for resale is an abuse of the Eighth Amendment and the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause. 
It may be anticipated that it may be argued that the evils 
allegedly associated with drugs in our society would justify a 
ruling that any amount of a controlled substance however small, 
which is capable of scientific detection through sensitive testing 
equipment would be sufficient to constitute a felony offense. The 
proponents of a harsh attack on users of pharmaceutical compounds 
often fail to take into account the substantial personal and social 
costs incurred by both society and the individual. According to 
recent news accounts, it will cost upwards of $25,000 per year to 
incarcerate Mr. Jensen. If he serves his entire term this could 
be an amount of $100,000 to $125,000. 
Further, Mr. Jensen is of course taken out of the workforce 
where, it may be presumed, he had earning capacities of $12,000 to 
20 
$15,000 per year. Thus, an additional $60,000 of lost earnings to 
Mr. Jensen personally will result. Economists commonly accept an 
economic multiplier effect that approximately five times the amount 
spent by a consumer will result to the general economy. Thus, the 
loss of earnings will result in approximate $300,000 loss to the 
economy. Of course, this analysis does not take into account the 
basic overhead of the Court system, including police, prosecutors, 
and associated staff workers, 
Further, the branding of Mr. Jensen as a "felon" will serve 
to dibble him permanently from accepting numerous occupations for 
which he may otherwise be qualified It will prevent him from 
voting, and will prevent him from serving in the Armed Forces of 
the United States. The long term consequences are subsfrani"'jal for 
a person so labeled. (At the common law there were no repeat 
felons, since it was, by definition, a hanging offense,} 
A better public policy would be to deal with people who have 
medical problems through the health care system. The fallout of 
the drug war has made little difference in the amount of usage of 
chemical substances by the general public, but has resulted in the 
wholesale incarceration of enormous numbers of individuals, many 
of whom are simply casual users. The diversion of scarce financial 
resources into the prosecution, police and imprisonment systems 
results in schools, hospitals and clinics being left without 
sufficient resources to educate the public with respect to the 
proper use of medicinal compounds or to effectively treat those 
individuals who have had the misfortune to become dependent upon 
chemical substances. 
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The current state of the drug enforcement most resembles the 
experiment this country entered into during prohibition by 
attempting to ban all alcoholic beverages- The rest of the world 
continued to produce spirits, wines and beer and the general public 
was unwilling to comply with a statute which was simply not 
believed in by many Individuals. However, by making a commonly 
available substance an illegal item, a black market W?IK rr^at^d
 r 
The istctLul<eb> Uiu^ 5 perversely encourage the consumption of alcohol 
by creating an economic incentive for the produc*/Ion - ^ le, and 
distribution through other than normal commercial channels. 
Similarly, the existence of a blackmarket whirh operates 
no.mTi.irrpntiv with the public health care system has created other 
problems. Drug cases have now come to constitute over half of th^ 
criminal case load in most courthouses in this nation,, As a 
consequence, legitimate civil 1 awfiu •»•"*•?
 p »^ ny of which have profound 
public policy consequences, do not reach trial for a protracted 
period of time, sometimes years. The imposition of ha^h and 
lengthy prison ^enf-enoe^ has; resulted in prisons operating at 100% 
to 150% of designed capacity. Further incarceration and 
warehousing of nth^ -rianse productive citizens who are all amenable 
to therapeutic treatment and health carp -inLervent Ion is no longer 
cost effective. 
The Governor recently opposed a plan to repeal a sales tax 
on food on t.h*^  \ heory that the 80 or 90 million dollars required 
would come directly out of the pocket of education. The new budget 
includes requosts that would require an additional 80 or 90 million 
dollars, not for education, but to fund additional prisons. 
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It would be a better public policy to divert individuals from 
the criminal system into the health care system where their only 
offense is some casual involvement with rue USR of phariuacwivi.'»n«l 
compounds* Five (5) year?,
 f imprisonment for the possession of 
paraphernalia, which normally is a maximum of six months, is 
p^PKfiivft and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Tn conclusion, th^ rv»Pendant requests that this Court decide 
that the amount of amphetamine in the sample sei ?ed f or** rh rYrnit/n 
v j. r\ !. i r-> 
felony offense of possession of a controlled subrt-^o-- In the 
ali^m^riv^ the D.viVnda^t requests that the matter be remanded 
for a new trial* 
Respectfully submitted. 
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